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Virtues and Their Vices, edited by Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd. Oxford
University Press, 2014. Pp. 528. $120 (hardcover); $40 (paperback).
ADAM PELSER, United States Air Force Academy
Following the pioneering work of luminaries such as G. E. M. Anscombe
and Alasdair MacIntyre, the revival of philosophical interest in the virtues over the past half-century has given rise to a vast body of literature
that is sometimes loosely categorized under the term “virtue theory,” but
that represents a diverse array of research questions, methods of inquiry,
and philosophical views. In the spirit of modern moral philosophy, many
virtue ethicists have attempted to demonstrate that all moral concepts
can be reduced to the notion of virtue, as opposed to duty or happiness.
In a similar vein, some virtue epistemologists have appealed to the notion of virtue in an attempt to define knowledge and resolve other central
epistemological questions. Other virtue theorists have turned to empirical
psychology to assess whether people actually have (or can develop) moral
and intellectual virtues.
In contrast to, though not necessarily in conflict with, these approaches
to the study of virtue, a small but growing number of philosophers and
scholars from other disciplines (notably theology and psychology) have
engaged in careful analysis of individual virtues, vices, and related
psychological states with the aim of contributing to a robust vision of
human flourishing and of deepening understanding of the human excellences constitutive of the good life. Virtues and Their Vices exemplifies
this approach to the study of the virtues and does more than any other
recent work to advance it. In this collection, Timpe and Boyd have gathered together many of the foremost scholars of virtue to produce a volume
notable not only for its impressive breadth—22 chapters, each written by
a different author or partnership of co-authors—but also for the consistent clarity and depth of insight of each of its chapters. Virtues and Their
Vices significantly clarifies and illuminates the virtues that foster human
flourishing and the vices that detract from it. This volume would be an
excellent introduction for students new to the study of the virtues, and it
is essential reading for scholars already working on character and moral
psychology.
The volume is largely structured around traditional groupings of the
virtues and vices. It contains five sections covering (1) the cardinal virtues,
(2) the capital vices and their corrective virtues, (3) intellectual virtues,
(4) the theological virtues, and (5) the virtues across various academic
disciplines. In the remainder of this review I will highlight some of the
distinctive themes and strengths (I think it fitting to call them “virtues”) of
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the volume that run across its various sections and I will conclude by noting some inevitable limitations (I certainly would not call them “vices”) of
the volume that point toward areas ripe for further research.
One virtue of the volume that I expect will be of special interest to readers of this journal is the volume’s sustained interaction with Christian
philosophical theology of the virtues and vices, especially as codified in
the writings of Thomas Aquinas. The history of Christian philosophicaltheological reflection on the virtues and vices provides a wealth of
resources for contemporary reflection on moral character, but these resources often go untapped by philosophers and psychologists working
in this area today. This neglect of engagement with traditional Christian
thought on moral character is especially evident in contemporary philosophical reflection on the vices (or, rather, the sparsity thereof). As one
piece of anecdotal evidence for such neglect, I was recently at a conference
on the theme of virtue cultivation where one senior philosopher working
in virtue ethics gave a talk on the need for a systematic philosophical
analysis of the vices, a kind of DSM for disorders of moral character, and
he was surprised to learn that Aquinas provides such a treatment of the
capital vices in his Summa and De Malo.
Though the contributors to Virtues and Their Vices represent a variety of
moral outlooks—some explicitly Christian, some not—the volume goes a
long way toward bringing contemporary scholarship on virtues and vices
(back) into conversation with the venerable history of Christian philosophical and theological reflection on the moral life. In addition to three
chapters focused on the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, as well
as an excellent chapter on “Virtue in Theology” by Stephen Pope, several
of the chapters on the cardinal virtues and the capital vices contain sustained critical engagement with Aquinas’s analyses of the traits (notably
the chapters on prudence, fortitude, lust, gluttony, sloth, envy, and pride).
In his chapter on pride, Craig Boyd also provides a helpful discussion of
Augustine’s treatment of superbia. Likewise, Colleen McCluskey, Robert
Kruschwitz, and Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung draw insightfully on the
Desert Fathers of the early Christian church, such as Evagrius of Pontus
and John Cassian, in their respective analyses of lust and chastity, gluttony
and abstinence, and sloth. McCluskey also draws on the wisdom of the
Desert Mother, Amma Sarah.
While many of the chapters in the volume interact with Christian philosophical theology, however, the volume is not (or at least not solely) aimed
at analyzing the virtues and vices from the perspective of Christianity. In
fact, another virtue of the volume is that many of the chapters present
divergent and competing traditional understandings of their focal trait in
order to clarify the nature of the trait. In his chapter on “Fortitude and
the Conflict of Frameworks,” for example, Daniel McInerny compares the
Northern courage depicted in Beowulf, Aquinas’s treatment of Christian
fortitude, and the contemporary notion, lauded by Steve Jobs in his wellknown Stanford University commencement address, of the courage to

384

Faith and Philosophy

listen to one’s own “inner voice.” McInerny also offers a helpful discussion, informed by MacIntyre, on how to adjudicate between competing
moral frameworks in our search for the truth.
In another notable example of this comparative frameworks approach,
McCluskey compares Aquinas’s treatment of lust as a vice and chastity
as a virtue with Simon Blackburn’s recent analysis of lust as a virtue and
chastity as a vice, noting that the two views are not as far apart as it might
seem. Kruschwitz likewise provides an insightful comparative evaluation
of the Stoic analysis of gluttony articulated by Epictetus’s teacher, Musonius Rufus, and Aquinas’s Christian analysis of the vice. Although Ruth
Groenhout’s chapter is not focused on a single virtue or vice, she engages
in a careful comparative analysis of the frameworks of virtue ethics, Confucian ethics, and feminist care ethics in an effort to show that Confucian
and care ethics do not fit very well within the category of virtue ethics in
the way that a common taxonomy of ethical theories might suggest.
As should be apparent by now, the volume is deeply rooted in and
indebted to historical philosophical treatments of the virtues and vices.
Despite its careful and sustained engagement with the history of philosophy, however, the volume is not solely or even primarily a work in the
history of philosophy of moral character. Yet another virtue of the volume
is that it brings ancient wisdom about the virtues and vices into conversation with contemporary scientific and philosophical research. James Van
Slyke, for example, draws on neuroscientific and psychological insights
about the connections between emotion and cognition and the processes
of imitation and simulation in order to better understand the formation of moral virtue and practical wisdom. He also offers a compelling
virtue-theoretic critique of recent attempts to develop a reductive science
of morality. In a different sort of engagement with contemporary neuro
science and psychology, Andrew Pinsent creatively draws on research
on autism and prosopagnosia (the inability to recognize faces) to explain
Dante’s treatment of avarice as a particularly insidious vice. According to
Pinsent, Dante recognized that avarice inhibits second-person relatedness,
thereby causing a kind of “spiritual prosopagnosia.” Though less engaged
with contemporary science than the two chapters just mentioned, Robert
Roberts’s chapter on temperance provides a compelling and deeply insightful Aristotelian analysis of the virtue. Roberts then brings his analysis
into conversation with current psychological understandings of addiction
in order to reveal the morally significant differences between suffering
from an addiction and having the vice of intemperance.
Two chapters that are particularly noteworthy for bringing ancient wisdom into conversation with contemporary philosophical research are John
Greco’s chapter on the intellectual virtue of episteme (which he identifies as
a kind of understanding) and Jason Baehr’s chapter on the intellectual virtue of sophia or wisdom. Both of these authors draw heavily on Aristotle in
their development of neo-Aristotelian analyses of the intellectual virtues,
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and they then clarify their analyses in conversation with contemporary
epistemological debates.
One final virtue of the book that deserves mention is the way in which it
illuminates the interconnections between the virtues and the vices. While
the editors rightly raise concerns about the unity and reciprocity of the
virtues theses in the introduction (pp. 9–11), certain virtues nevertheless
seem to complement one another and even depend on each other for their
fullest realization. Jay Wood highlights this interconnectedness of several
virtues in his chapter on prudence and Roberts offers an insightful explanation of the interdependence of temperance and justice in his chapter on
the former. Also, as the section heading “The Capital Vices and Corrective
Virtues” suggests, the chapters on the capital vices carefully consider the
virtues that oppose and help to correct the individual vices. While she
does not focus directly on the interdependence of various virtues, in her
chapter on trust, Linda Zagzebski presents a compelling case that many
of the virtues of the intellect are dependent on epistemic trust. As she puts
it, “Epistemic trust has a crucial role in intellectual virtue since many of
the intellectual virtues are either enhancements of epistemic trust or constraints on it” (269). In a similar move with respect to the moral virtues,
Pope argues that all of the virtues depend for their content or “form” on
charity. Interestingly, though, he argues that it is possible to possess practical wisdom about matters pertaining to salvation (infused prudence)
while lacking practical wisdom about the ordinary affairs of life (acquired
prudence).
Having highlighted four notable virtues of this volume, I conclude by
drawing attention to some limitations of the volume that point toward
areas ripe for further research. The first has to do with the volume’s treatment of the intellectual virtues. The editors point out that their section on
intellectual virtues diverges from Aristotle’s list by including a chapter
on trust and no chapter on techne or nous (24), but the volume nevertheless reflects Aristotle’s treatment of the intellectual virtues by focusing on
epistemic goods or achievements, as opposed to traits such as open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual respect. Of course, there is
nothing wrong with following Aristotle’s characterization of the intellectual virtues. And Zagzebski’s chapter on trust does helpfully discuss
several intellectual trait virtues. So, the absence of individual chapters
on these virtues is no real flaw of the volume. Yet, readers looking for
in-depth treatments of intellectual character traits will have to look elsewhere (e.g., Roberts and Woods’s Intellectual Virtues [Oxford University
Press, 2007]).
A second limitation of the volume is that, given its focus on understanding the natures of the virtues and vices, it devotes relatively little attention
to questions surrounding how to cultivate the virtues and eliminate the
vices. Of course, reflecting carefully and deeply on the nature of the virtues and vices through the lens of robust moral outlooks can enhance the
moral understanding constitutive of practical wisdom and inspire efforts
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at virtue cultivation. Virtues and Their Vices thus importantly contributes to
the project of moral formation. Moreover, some of the chapters in the volume explicitly discuss strategies and practices for cultivating the virtues
and eliminating the vices (see, e.g., the chapters on temperance, gluttony,
and sloth). Nevertheless, philosophers of virtue would do the academic
community, the Church, and our society a great service by devoting more
attention to understanding the processes of virtue formation. While it obviously cannot accomplish everything in the space of one book, Virtues and
Their Vices points to the need for more research in this area. To its credit,
it also provides excellent foundational treatments of the virtues and vices
that should help guide such research for many years to come. (Disclaimer:
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily
reflect the official policies or positions of the US Air Force, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.)

